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state employment practices and would invalidate the practice of at-will public employment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict over the availability of the class-of-one theory in public employment cases.
The Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the class-of-one theory is not available in public employment cases. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion begins by reaffirming that the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not groups, and that it generally applies to states acting as employers. Nonetheless, the majority's traditional view of the core concern of the Amendment as a shield against arbitrary classifications and the unique considerations applicable to governments acting as employers led it to reject the class-of-one theory in the public employment context. While the majority concedes that citizens do not lose their constitutional rights when they become governmental employees, those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context.
Distinguishing the Court's prior decisions recognizing a class of a single person (where, for example, a municipality refused to permit a resident to connect to a municipal water supply), the majority says that in non-employment cases there are objective standards for determining whether there is a rational basis for singling out the class of one person. In the employment context, however, treating individual employees differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion necessarily granted to employers, who have to make subjective and individualized decisions based on an array of factors that are hard to quantify or even articulate. Allowing class-of-one claims would, therefore, undermine the employer's discretion, repudiate the at-will doctrine in public employment, jeopardize governmental efficiency and force state and municipal employers to defend a multitude of claims. Declining, therefore, to constitutionalize every employment grievance, the Court affirms the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and concludes that the class-of-one theory is simply a "poor fit" in the employment context: "To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship." Slip Op., p. 12.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented, expressing the view that the majority has simply created an exception from the Fourteenth Amendment's protection applicable to state employees. Pointing out that Oregon offered no explanation for its treatment of Engquist and expressly disclaimed the existence of any workplace or performance-related rationale, the dissent finds no basis for differentiating this case from the Court's prior recognition of class-of-one claims singling out individuals for disparate treatment where there is no conceivable rational basis for doing so.
The dissent agrees that public employers make inherently discretionary decisions and that they must be free to exercise that authority, but Justice Stevens points out the clear distinction between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary decision: A discretionary decision involves a choice amongst rational alternatives, while an arbitrary decision is one that rests on no rational justification at all. So, even a random choice or a coin flip between two rational alternatives would not violate an employee's rights, but a decision with no conceivable rational basis that rests soley on malice or vindictiveness should be a violation of equal protection. The dissent, therefore, asserts that the Court should have used a scalpel instead of a meat-axe in order to confine class-of-one claims to those involving a "complete absence of any conceivable rational basis" for the disparate adverse treatment of an employee. Dissent Slip Op., p. 6.
Justice Stevens' opinion also suggests that the at-will doctrine has been eroded legislatively and judicially and that preserving its "remnants" is a feeble justification for a broad exception to the Fourteenth Amendment's protection. Likewise, the dissenters acknowledge the majority's fear that public employers might have to defend class-of-one claims, but counter that such claims are relatively infrequent, are usually asserted along with other claims, and are ordinarily dismissed well in advance of trial. The dissenters, therefore, find no compelling reason to carve arbitrary employment decisions out of the well-established category of equal protection violations, particularly when the familiar rational review standard can limit such claims to employer actions that are "wholly unjustified." Id., p. 8. Hedrick G. Humphries, a black former assistant manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant, sued the restaurant's owner, CBOCS West, Inc., claiming that it had discharged him because of racial bias and because he had complained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had fired Venus Green, another black employee, for race-based reasons. The suit alleged claims under Title VII and Rev. Stat. 1977, 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) , commonly known as Section 1981 or just 1981.
But, think for a minute about the last statement: this case "only eliminates the Constitution as a source of rights and remedies for public employees." There is nothing in the text of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that carves employment out of its reach. Indeed, the reference to "[n]o person" in relation to the equal protection of the laws indicates that arbitrary treatment of individualswithout regard to their membership in a group or class -is the target of the Clause's prohibition. Employer conduct that is not rationally based (for example, the groundless exercise of an employer's prerogative under the at-will doctrine) denies a person the full protection of the law and is thus precisely what the Equal Protection Clause prohibits. The Court's refusal to enforce the constitutional promise of equal protection is thus not just an employer-friendly gesture; it is a distressing failure of the Court's judicial duty under Article III of the Constitution.

From the perspective of local and state employees, such as law enforcement officers, firefighters, corrections officers, emt's and other first responders, this decision must be a disturbing one. Even more disappointing to these brave protectors of us all must be the majority's rationale that governmental efficiency in the service of profit is more important than treating employees in a rational, non-arbitrary manner. To be sure, having to defend spurious claims and justify employer actions may involve some unproductive use of public funds, but the Court's response to that problem was simply to blink away the Fourteenth Amendment, instead of trying to harmonize the parties' competing rights and interests (as it does in private sector cases through allocating proof burdens and other such techniques.) In any event, as a result of the Court's decision (and absent statutory protection), public employers are now constitutionally free -most notably in right-to-work states -to treat their police officers, firefighters and other employees arbitrarily and irrationally with impunity.
One unintended consequence of this decision is that it makes the argument for unionization of public employees more compelling. It would be a twisted irony, indeed, for this anti-employee decision to turn out to be a pro-labor harbinger. Almost lost in the blizzard of words about the case are two other ironic circumstances. First, there is, as noted above, Chief Justice Roberts' atextual and ahistorical opinion carving out a judicial exception to the Equal Protection Clause where none exists in either the text or context of the Clause. Second, there is the regrettable irony that a case exemplifying the plainest and most elementary form of discrimination -i.e., differentiating between similarly situated employees -is regarded by a majority of Justices as falling outside the judicial construct of "discrimination." In summary, this decision appears to be a continuation of the approach taken by a majority of the Roberts Court to protect and enhance employer prerogatives, even in the face of a plainly applicable
The district court dismissed the Title VII claims on a procedural ground and granted CB's motion for summary judgment on the two 1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment on the 1981 race discrimination claim, but remanded the 1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CB's argument that 1981 does not encompass a claim of retaliation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the retaliation question.
The Court affirmed in a 7 to 2 decision. Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court concluding that 1981 encompasses retaliation claims is based in significant part on prinicples of stare decisis. The Court first explains that in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) , it construed 42 U.S.C. 1982, a sister statute safeguarding equal property ownership rights, to permit a victim of retaliation to sue. Noting that the Court later made clear in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) , that Sullivan stands for the proposition that 1982 encompasses retaliation claims, Justice Breyer stresses that the sister statute has long been construed similarly because of their common language, origin and purpose. In light of these precedents, therefore, the Court does not find it surprising that the lower courts had concluded that 1981, as it stood at the time of Sullivan, encompassed retaliation.
Looking to the post-Sullivan amended text of 1981, Justice Breyer recites the familiar history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to overrule a number of Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980's. Justice Breyer focuses particularly on the new text protecting the "enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." That language, according to the legislative history cited by the majority, specifically protects the right to sue for "retaliatory conduct." H. R. pt. 1, p. 93, n. 92, quoted at Slip Op., p. 7 . Again, the lower courts responded by uniformly construing 1981 to include retaliation claims. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the view that 1981 prohibits retaliation is "well embedded" in the law, that considerations of stare decisis strongly support the Court's adherence to that view, and that those seeking a different interpretation (which would unsettle many precedents) bear a "considerable burden" of persuasion.
The Court then rejects CB's attempt to meet the burden of overcoming considerations of stare decisis. As to the text of 1981, the Court agrees that the language does not expressly cover retaliation, but that fact alone is not, in the majority's view, "sufficient to carry the day." Noting that this linguistic argument was apparent when Sullivan was decided, the Court opines that it is "too late in the day" to overturn Sullivan on a ground that was known to the Court at that time. The Court also rejects CB's argument that by failing to include retaliation explicitly in the 1991 amendment, Congress intended that retaliation claims not be covered. The majority finds it far more plausible, in light of both Sullivan and the amended language confirming 1981's broader coverage, that there was no need to include the word "retaliation" in the statute. The Court likewise finds unavailing CB's argument that allowing retaliation claims under 1981 would permit plaintiffs to circumvent Title VII's mechanisms and undermine their effectiveness. Justice Breyer points to the necessary overlap between the two statutes which the courts have regarded as reflective of Congressional design, since Title VII was intended to supplement, not supplant, existing law.
Finally, the Court rejects CB's reliance on two recent decisions, noting first that the status/conduct distinction drawn in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2007) , was used only to explain why Congress might have wanted Title VII's explicit anti-retaliation provision to sweep more broadly (i.e., outside the workplace.) BNSF did not, however, suggest that status and conduct discrimination must be treated separately for all purposes. The Court likewise declines CB's invitation to reexamine Sullivan because the Court's current approach to statutory interpretation emphasizes text moreso than when Sullivan was decided. The majority expressly rejects reexamination of well-established prior law, even if one assumes that a change in interpretive approach has taken place. As the Court explains its application of stare decisis: "Principles of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of law depends." Slip op., p. 14.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented on the basis that the right of action implied under 1981 does not encompass claims of retaliation and that the Court's decision has no basis in the text and is not justified by principles of stare decisis. Justice Thomas asserts that discrimination is all that 1981 regulates (even though that term is not part of the text) and that retaliation is not a form of discrimination, despite the fact that reprisal is an intentional form of differentiating (i.e., discriminating) amongst people. Characterizing the majority's opinion to the contrary as "nonsense," Justice Thomas grounds his reasoning on the status/ conduct distinction that he says the Court adopted in prior decisions. Finally, Justice Thomas, accusing the majority of "retreat [ing] The Court decided that section 633a(a) of the ADEA prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination.
Myrna Gomez-Perez, a 45 year old window distribution clerk at the Dorado, P.R. post office, requested a transfer in October of 2002 to a post office in Moca, P.R., nearer to her ill mother. Following approval of the transfer, Gomez-Perez worked in a part-time position in Moca for less than a month before requesting a transfer back to her old job. Her request was denied because her supervisor had converted the Dorado position to part-time and filled it with another employee. Gomez-Perez filed a union grievance and a Postal Service age discrimination complaint, after which her supervisor leveled groundless complaints at her, falsely accused her of sexual harassment and reduced her hours. Her co-workers also, allegedly, told her to go back to where she belonged. Gomez-Perez then filed suit claiming, among other things, that the Postal Service had violated section 633a(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") by retaliating against her for filing the discrimination complaint.
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity for ADEA retaliation claims. The First Circuit held that the Postal Reorganization Act had waived the Postal Service's immunity, but that section 633a(a) does not cover retaliation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in view of a circuit conflict on the statutory coverage question.
The Court ruled in a 6 to 3 decision that the federal sector ADEA provision requiring that all personnel actions "shall be made free from any discrimination based on age" includes retaliation based on the filing of an age discrimination complaint. Justice Alito's opinion finds the Postal Service's attempt to distinguish Jackson unpersuasive. First, the implied right of action for discrimination under Title IX did not, in the majority's view, give the Court greater leeway to imply a retaliation claim there. Indeed, the majority points out that it would be odd to interpret the express right of action under the ADEA more narrowly than an implied right of action under Title IX. Second, the Court rejected the argument that retaliation claims play a more important role under Title IX than under the ADEA. The language in Jackson about the importance of retaliation claims for teachers and coaches as advocates for their students simply addressed an argument that such claims should be limited to victims of discrimination. Those statements did not address whether discrimination encompasses retaliation. Third, the majority finds unavailing the distinction that the ADEA federal sector provisions were adopted in a context unlike Title IX. Justice Alito reviews the history of both provisions and concludes that in both cases Congress was thoroughly familiar with Sullivan and that it expected both statutes to be interpreted consistently with Sullivan's construction of Section 1982. Even more to the point, if Congress had Sullivan in mind in 1972 when it enacted Title IX, it is realistic to presume that it had both Sullivan and Title IX in mind just two years later when it enacted the federal sector provisions of the ADEA.
The majority finds no merit in the employer's argument that the absence in the federal sector provision of an express prohibition of retaliation, like that found in the private sector part of the ADEA, raises a strong presumption that the omission was intentional. Because the two provisions were neither considered nor enacted together, no such negative implication is raised by the difference in the provisions. Moreover, Justice Alito points out that the federal sector ADEA text is patterned on Title VII's federal sector language which itself does not incorporate Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Where Congress decided not to pattern the federal sector portion of the ADEA after its private sector regime, the absence of an express prohibition on retaliation is of no moment. The Court sees even less merit in the employer's argument that recognizing retaliation would contravene section 633a(f). That argument, according to Justice Alito, is unsound because the Court's holding is based squarely on a section of the ADEA that is expressly excepted from coverage under section 633a(f). The Court next rejects the employer's argument that retaliation in the federal government can be addressed only through the Civil Service Commissions prohibitions on reprisals. Finding no direct evidence of such an intent, the Court declines to embrace the speculative notion that Congress expected the Civil Service Commission to fill the regulatory gap on retaliation. Finally, Justice Alito concludes that sovereign immunity does not constrain the Court here, as section 633a(c) unequivocally waives such immunity for a claim brought by any person aggrieved to remedy a violation of section 633a(a). Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the First Circuit and remands the case for further proceedings.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas as to all but one part, dissented. In their view, while protection against discrimination may sometimes include protection against retaliation, it does not in this case because of the separate treatment of private sector retaliation under the ADEA and because Congress has always protected federal employees from reprisal under the Civil Service and thus did not intend for those employees to have a separate judicial remedy under the ADEA.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a separate dissenting opinion joining all but the part of the Chief Justice's dissent dealing with whether discrimination includes retaliation. Justice Thomas' opinion expresses the view that discrimination and retaliation are separate concepts and that section 633a(a) provides no basis for implying a right of action for the latter. Sprint/United Management Company ("Sprint") terminated Ellen Mendelsohn's employment in its Business Development Strategy Group as part of a company-wide reduction in force in 2002. Mendelsohn, a thirteen year employee, sued Sprint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and sought to introduce so-called "me too" evidence consisting of testimony from five former Sprint employees who claimed that their supervisors had discriminated against them because of their age. Three witnesses claimed that they heard supervisors or managers make remarks denigrating older workers. One of these witnesses, asserting that Sprint's intern program was a mechanism for age discrimination, would say that she had seen a spreadsheet suggesting that supervisors had considered age in making layoff decisions. Another witness would testify about receiving a negative evaluation, observing harassment because of age and being banned from working at Sprint because of his age. The fifth witness would testify that Sprint required him to get permission before hiring anyone over 40, that he had been replaced by a younger employee and that Sprint had rejected his subsequent employment applications.
None of the five witnesses offered by Mendelsohn worked in her group, nor had any of them worked under supervisors in her chain of command. Also, none of the witnesses reported hearing any of the discriminatory remarks alleged to have been made by Mendelsohn's direct supervisor, direct manager (the decisionmaker in Mendelsohn's termination) and group head. On these facts Sprint moved in limine to exclude the proffered testimony because it was not relevant under Rules 401 and 402 and any probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, jury misleading and undue delay.
The district court granted Sprint's motion in a minute order, excluding evidence from witnesses who were not "similarly situated" to Mendelsohn. At trial, however, the district judge orally explained that the minute order would not bar testimony about whether the reduction in force was a pretext for age discrimination. The Tenth Circuit, treating the minute order as a per se exclusion of evidence from witnesses with other supervisors, concluded that the district court had abused its discretion. The panel then determined that the proffered evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and it reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding in a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas that the Tenth Circuit erred in concluding that the district court had applied a per se rule excluding the "me too" evidence and that the case should have been remanded to the district court for clarification of the minute order. Justice Thomas stressed that the Court of Appeals did not afford the district court a sufficient degree of deference demanded by the trial court's familiarity with the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters. Finding no basis in the district court's minute order that it was applying a per se rule of exclusion of "me too" evidence, Justice Thomas concludes that an appellate court should not presume that a trial judge intended an incorrect legal result when the judge's order is equally susceptible of a correct reading, particularly when the appellate standard of review is deferential.
The Court also concluded that "questions of relevance and prejudice are for the District Court to determine in the first place" and that the Tenth Circuit further erred in determining those questions on its own. The opinion stresses that a district court "is virtually always" in a better position to assess the admissibility of evidence in the context of the case before it. Noting, however, relevance and prejudice are determined in particular factual contexts and are "generally not amenable to broad per se rules," Justice Thomas notes that had the district court applied a per se rule excluding the "me too" evidence, that would have been a reversible abuse of discretion. In this case, however, the Court found "no basis in the record" for concluding that the district court had applied a blanket rule.
The Court's opinion concludes with the notion that the relevance of "me too" evidence is "fact based" and depends on many factors, including "how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case." Likewise, the Court opines that prejudice also requires a "fact-intensive, contextspecific inquiry." Accordingly, the Court posits that Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se inadmissible and that the inquiry required by these rules is "within the province" of the trial court in the first instance. On this basis, the Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to have the district court clarify the basis for its evidentiary ruling under the applicable rules of evidence. The Court decided that an employer defending a disparate impact claim under the ADEA bears the burdens of production and persuasion on the issue (which the Court holds is an affirmative defense) of whether an employer's action is based on "reasonable factors other than age."
Clifford Meacham and 27 other laid off employees of Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory ("Knolls") sued Knolls under the ADEA and state law, alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under the ADEA and state law. Knolls operates a federal government atomic laboratory, funded jointly by the U.S. Navy and the Department of Energy, to design prototype naval nuclear reactors and train Navy personnel to operate them as part of the nation's maintenance of its fleet of nuclear-powered warships. As the demand for naval nuclear reactors changed with the end of the Cold War, Knolls was ordered to reduce its workforce. Following reductions through voluntary buyouts, Knolls still had about 30 jobs to cut. It did so by relying in part on its managers' assessment of the remaining employees' performance, flexibility and critical skills. Scores on those three factors were added to points for years of service, and the totals determined who would be laid off. As a result of this process, 30 of the 31 employees selected for layoff were at least 40 years old. To support their disparate impact claim, the employees relied on a statistical expert's conclusion that results so skewed according to age could rarely occur by chance. Also, the expert concluded that the firmest statistical ties to layoff were scores over which the managers had the most discretion, namely flexibility and criticality.
A jury ruled for the employer on the disparate treatment claim, but found for the employees on the disparate impact claim. The Second Circuit affirmed, and after Knolls sought certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings in light of Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), which was decided while Knolls' petition for certiorari was pending. On remand a panel of the Second Circuit ruled in Knolls' favor, holding that Meacham had not carried the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the layoffs were based on a reasonable factor other than age. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, this time based on a circuit split over who bears the burden of proof on the ADEA's provision in 29 U.S.C. 623(f) exempting from ADEA liability an employer's action "where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age," the so-called RFOA provision.
The Court again vacated the Second Circuit's judgment in an opinion by Justice Souter, with Justice Breyer taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case. The Court held that an employer facing a disparate impact claim under the ADEA and defending on the basis of a reasonable factor other than age "must not only produce evidence raising the defense, but also persuade the factfinder of its merit." 171 L. Ed. 2d at 288. Justice Souter's opinion first reads the text of the RFOA as an affirmative defense, like its companion bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) provision. Absent any hint in the text to the contrary, the Court concludes that the language and structure of the statute is convincing evidence of Congress' intent to treat the RFOA as an affirmative defense as to which the party asserting it has the burden of persuasion. In a footnote Justice Souter expressly declines to rely on EEOC regulations that he concludes do not clearly answer the question in this case. The Court also finds persuasive an amendment to a companion subsection by which Congress made clear that the text of section 623(f)(2) is to be read as an affirmative defense. Justice Souter's opinion declines to embrace Knolls' argument that the RFOA simply elaborates on the definition of liability under section 623(a)(2) by negating the premise "because of age." Explaining that a prior decision had relied on the RFOA as a defense and not as an expression of liability, the Court concludes that the focus of the RFOA in a disparate impact case is on reasonableness as a justification, not on whether a non-age factor is at work. Similarly, the Court rejects the Second Circuit's view that the RFOA should be read like the "business necessity" enquiry -i.e., that the burden of persuasion rests on the complaining party. Concluding that references in Smith v. City of Jackson, supra, have been read otherwise, Justice Souter regards the Court's prior language about the ADEA in disparate impact situations as not supportive, much less dispositive, of the question in this case. Finally, the Court finds the parade of horribles argument about "strike suit" litigation to be blunted by the burden on ADEA plaintiffs in disparate impact cases to isolate and identify the specific unlawful practice. And, the opinion suggests that employers should take comfort from the fact that the employer's burden will be light where the contested factor is reasonable and that their burden will only be significant where the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure. To the extent that the Court's decision affects how employers do business, it is up to Congress to alter the balance it set by writing the RFOA exemption in the "orthodox format of an affirmative defense." 171 L. Ed. 2d at 297. Hence, the Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit for a decision based on the proper placement of the burden of persuasion as to the reasonableness of the criteria used by Knolls.
Justice Scalia declined to join the Court's opinion, but concurred in its judgment. In his view the Court should simply have deferred to the EEOC's "unquestionably reasonable" position on the proper application of the RFOA. The Solicitor General's brief on behalf of the EEOC urges that the RFOA is an affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of persuasion and that in ADEA disparate impact cases the RFOA replaces the "business necessity" test on which plaintiffs have the burden of persuasion. Justice Scalia embraces those views as a matter of judicial deference to the agency charged with administering the ADEA.
Justice Thomas joined only a portion of the Court's opinion, but concurred in part in its judgment. In his view disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA and the RFOA is not principally relevant in disparate impact cases. Accordingly, he joined only those portions of the Court's opinion holding that the RFOA is an affirmative defense (when it arises in a disparate treatment case.) Because the claims here are disparate impact claims, therefore, Justice Thomas would affirm, even though the Second Circuit erred in placing the burden of proof on Meacham and his colleagues. Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 at 408, n. 10 (1985) The Court decided that an EEOC intake questionnaire, supplemented by a charging party's affidavit requesting the agency to take action on her behalf, constitutes a charge of discrimination under the ADEA.
Paul Holowecki and thirteen other current and former employees of Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") who were over the age of 40 sued FedEx claiming that two of its productivity programs discriminated against them in violation of the ADEA. The suit alleged that the two programs were a veiled attempt to force older workers out of employment before they would be entitled to receive retirement benefits. FedEx moved to dismiss the claims of one of the plaintiffs, Patricia Kennedy, on the ground that she had not filed her charge with the EEOC at least 60 days before filing suit, as required by 29 U.S.C. 626(d). Kennedy responded by claiming that she had filed a valid charge by submitting EEOC Form 283 ("Intake Questionnaire") to the agency within the required time period. Kennedy had attached to the form a signed affidavit alleging the discriminatory practices in greater detail.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, determining that the documents Kennedy filed did not constitute a charge under the statute. The Second Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Kennedy's filing was a charge.
The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment in a 7 to 2 decision. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority concludes first, that a filing is deemed to be a charge under the ADEA if it can be reasonably construed to request agency action and appropriate relief on the filer's behalf. Second, the Court concludes that Kennedy's filing of the Intake Questionnaire and affidavit met that requirement. The Court's opinion begins by admonishing the employment bar that, because the ADEA is distinct from Title VII and other statutes enforced by the EEOC, lawyers and litigants "must be careful not to apply rules applicable to one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination. . . even if the EEOC forms and the same definition of a charge apply in more than one type of discrimination case." 170 L. Ed. 2d at 17.
Focusing first on the issue of what constitutes a "charge" and observing that the ADEA does not define the term, the Court concludes that the EEOC's procedural regulations "fall short" of a comprehensive definition of the same. In this case the Government took the position that while the EEOC's regulations do not state all the elements of a charge, an intake questionnaire can constitute a charge if it expresses the filer's intent to activate the EEOC's processes. Justice Kennedy's opinion defers to the agency's interpretation of its regulations as not comprehensively defining the elements of a charge because that position is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. Likewise, the majority, finding the regulations silent on the precise elements of a charge, accorded a deferential "measure of respect" to the EEOC's policy statements in its compliance manual and internal directives about what suffices as a charge. Excusing as unavoidable some uneven implementation of its position that a charge is filed when the filer requests agency action, the Court found that the EEOC's position had been binding on its staff for at least five years and that it was not framed for the specific purpose of aiding a party in this case. After finding no alternatives to the EEOC's "requestto-act" position within the Court's authority or expertise, therefore, the Court defers to the EEOC's position by concluding as follows:
"In addition to the information required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charging party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee." 170 L. Ed. 2d at 22.
The Court stresses that the filing is to be regarded from the standpoint of an objective observer and is not one that requires a subjective determination as to the filer's state of mind. Acknowledging that the standard it approves is a "permissive" one and that the EEOC could adopt a different standard requiring a more explicit request from charging parties, Justice Kennedy notes that tightening the definition of a charge is a matter for the EEOC to decided "in light of its experience and expertise in protecting the rights of those who are covered" by the ADEA. Id. at 23. Lastly, the majority rejects FedEx's argument that the EEOC's failure to notify the employer and initiate conciliation precludes regarding the filing as a charge. Not only did the EEOC similarly reject this argument, but Justice Kennedy finds FedEx's reliance on the text of the ADEA "artificial" and its attempt to make the definition of a charge dependent on agency action over which the parties have no control illogical and impractical.
On the second issue -whether the filing in this case meets the standard approved by the CourtJustice Kennedy opines that the EEOC "says it does, and we agree." Id. at 24. Finding that the Form 283 was supplemented with a six page affidavit asking the EEOC to "please force Federal Express to end their age discrimination plan so we can finish out our careers absent the unfairness and hostile work environment," the majority concluded that this filing is properly construed as a request to act. And, in combination with the charging party's waiver of anonymity by checking a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to the employer, the Court regarded the entire filing as being within the definition of a charge adopted by the Court in this case.
The majority opinion ends with a section emphasizing that the EEOC's failure to treat the filing as a charge deprived both sides of the benefits of the ADEA's informal dispute resolution process and, in particular, gave "short shrift" to FedEx's interests by failing to notify it of the charging party's complaint until she filed suit. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy stresses that the district court can stay the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement, even though his opinion notes that the dispute may now be in a "more rigid cast" than if conciliation had been attempted at the outset. Taking note of this "unfortunate" result, the majority urges the EEOC to determine what additional revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion. The dissent characterizes the majority's opinion as one that decides that a charge is whatever the EEOC says it is. While Justice Thomas expresses disagreement with some of the majority's language, he agrees with the EEOC's position -as did the majority -that a charge means a writing that objectively indicates an intent to initiate the EEOC's enforcement process. The dissent gets to that position, however, by relying on a dictionary definition of the term "charge," as well as the ordinary and common understanding of that term in administrative and employment discrimination law. On the issue of whether the filing in this case meets the definition, Justice Thomas concludes that it does not because there is no objective indication that the employee intended to initiate the EEOC's processes. The failure to request a particular form of remedial action -in contrast to what Justice Thomas says is a mere request for help -is fatal to the filing as a charge. And, checking the box that waives the filer's anonymity is not, according to the dissent, a basis for broadening the form's narrow purpose. Contrasting the intake questionnaire with the EEOC's Form 5 ("Charge of Discrimination"), Justice Thomas finds that the form "chosen by the complainant" is strong evidence of her intent not to commence an EEOC enforcement process. Finally, the dissent points to the EEOC's failure in this case to treat this filing as a charge as an objective indication of an intent to invoke the agency's enforcement processes. Accordingly, the dissent would hold that the documents filed here did not constitute a charge and did not preserve Patricia Kennedy's right to sue FedEx. Finally, the dissent notes the far reaching implications of this decision, namely that its failure to apply a clear and sensible rule for determining whether a filing is a charge renders its ruling of little use to complainants, employers or the EEOC itself. The Court decided that a state disability retirement plan that makes age a condition of pension eligibility and treats disabled workers differently in light of their pension status does not necessarily discriminate because of age.
Kentucky's special retirement plan for state and county employees in hazardous positions (e.g., law enforcement officers, firefighters, paramedics and correctional officers) makes these employees eligible for "normal retirement" benefits one of two ways: (a) after 20 years of service or (b) after 5 years of service if the employee has attained the age of 55. Either way, the pension benefit for "normal retirement" is calculated as follows: [years of service] x [2.5%] x [final preretirement pay]. For hazardous workers who become disabled, but are not yet eligible for "normal retirement," the Plan permits the employees to retire at once if one has worked for 5 years or becomes disabled in the line of duty. In such case the Plan adds imputed years of service equal to the number of years the employee would have had to continue working in order to become eligible for "normal retirement" benefits (subject to a ceiling equal to the number of years the employee has previously worked.)
Charles Lickteig, a hazardous position worker in a sheriff's department, became eligible for normal retirement at age 55, but continued to work until he became disabled and retired at age 61. Because he became disabled after normal retirement age, the Plan did not impute any additional years of service to his account. Lickteig filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Commission then sued Kentucky (and other defendants) under the ADEA claiming that the Plan failed to impute years to Lickteig solely because he became disabled after age 55. The district court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, and a panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The en banc Sixth Circuit granted rehearing and reversed, holding that the Plan did violate the ADEA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of the potentially serious impact of the Sixth Circuit's decision on pension benefits provided under plans in effect in several states.
The Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and held that the Plan does not discriminate because of age within the meaning of the ADEA. Justice Breyer's opinion for the majority views this case as a variant on the Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) , holding that without evidence of intent to discriminate based on age (instead of pension status), the discharge of a 62 year old employee within 6 months of vesting in pension benefits did not violate the ADEA. Recognizing that the Plan here refers explicitly to age, the majority nonetheless concludes on the basis of several considerations that Kentucky's disparate treatment of older disabled employees was not "actually motivated" by age. First, age and pension status are analytically distinct, according to the Court. Second, pension status here is not a proxy for age, as eligibility is not decided on an individualized age-related basis. Instead, age is one factor among many in a complex set of rules applicable to all employees regardless of age. Third, the rationale behind the plan's disparate treatment is to treat disabled employees more favorably, not older employees less favorably. Age is a factor only because the normal retirement rules employ it. Any disparity, therefore, "turns on pension eligibility and nothing more." Slip op., p. 9. Fourth, the Court posited that the Plan could in other circumstances work to the advantage of an older employee, thus confirming that its underlying motive is not age-related. Fifth, the Plan is based on assumptions about pension eligibility, not the stereotypical age-related assumptions that the ADEA was intended to eradicate. Sixth, Kentucky would have difficulty devising a remedy for imputing years to workers over 55 without jeopardizing the financial stability of the Plan. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Plan does not create differences that are "actually motivated" by age. The majority adopts the following rule for this sort of case: "Where an employer adopts a pension plan that includes age as a factor, and that employer then treats employees differently based on pension status, a plaintiff, to state a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA, must adduce sufficient evidence to show that the differential treatment was 'actually motivated' by age, not pension status." [Italics in original] Id., p. 11.
The majority finds beside the point the EEOC's argument that an ADEA amendment added by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") making clear that age-based discrimination respecting all employee benefits is covered by the ADEA. Justice Breyer does not dispute that the ADEA applies here. His opinion's rationale is that the discrimination is not actually motivated by age. The majority also declines to defer to the EEOC's contrary interpretation of the ADEA in the agency's compliance manual and one of its regulations. Because the regulation does little more than restate the statutory prohibition, it is not entitled to deference. The Compliance Manual's more pertinent and detailed statements are entitled to "respect" but they do not persuade the Court to come to a different conclusion.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Alito, dissented, concluding that where a benefit plan makes age a factor to the detriment of older employees, that violates the ADEA. Criticizing the additional burden the Court puts on plaintiffs to prove actual motivation, the dissenters note that such a requirement finds no support in the ADEA's text. Indeed, the statute, as amended by OWBPA and construed by the EEOC, indicates that age-related differentials in benefits are violations, and Kentucky here did not show that any exemption or affirmative defense protected it. The dissent opines that Hazen Paper does not support the majority's view because the Court there made clear that no additional proof of motive is required when the employer's policy is discriminatory on its face. Likewise, Justice Kennedy finds beside the point the majority's comment, based on Hazen Paper, that age and pension status remain analytically distinct, arguing that pension status was tied solely to years of service in that case, whereas age is an active component in the scheme of the Plan here.
The dissent criticizes the majority's argument that there is no discrimination where age is one of a complex of factors in determining benefits, pointing out that the Court has in other cases rejected such a definition of discrimination. Finally, the dissent finds unpersuasive the majority's characterization of the case as one where the employer had the laudable motive of trying to assist disabled employees. Relying on Kentucky's own submission to the Court, Justice Kennedy points out that the state's motive in giving a "boost" to younger employees is one that plainly contravenes the ADEA. While the dissent expresses appreciation for the notion that the ADEA should not be construed in a way that encourages reducing or even eliminating employee benefits, Kentucky should nonetheless be obliged to conform its commendable public policy to the plain text of the ADEA. Accordingly, the dissent would remand the case for a determination of whether Kentucky can assert a cost-justification defense. * * * * 
The practical significance of this decision is uncertain at this point. The problem with the Kentucky plan stemmed from its use of age as a factor in its normal retirement benefits, instead of just basing eligibility for and computation of benefits on years of service. It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether Kentucky's plan is anomalous or is typical of state retirement plans and, consequently, whether disability benefits are so explicitly tied to age in a wide range of plans. The Court's decision, nonetheless, puts a serious potential difficulty to rest and avoids the wholesale retooling of disability benefit plans that a contrary ruling might have caused. To this extent, the case may turn out to be an important one in the area of pension plan design.
It is considerably more certain that, from a doctrinal point of view, the rationale offered by the majority for its decision could cause significant havoc in the employment discrimination arena. Part of the Court's definition of what it means to discriminate seems at odds with what it has said in other cases where a particular protected trait is one of several factors determining employee benefits. E.g., Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (Explicit use of gender, among other factors, to determine pension benefits violates Title VII); Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (Same). If the Court's concept of discrimination here is really one that excludes situations where a protected trait is one of a complex of factors, that would signal a new and convenient way for employers to deny that they have engaged in discrimination, despite relying expressly on a prohibited trait. In this regard, the dissent justifiably expresses a serious concern about a rationale that could materially cabin the reach of the antidiscrimination laws.
Another aspect of the majority's rationale carries a similar prospect for limiting coverage in a way that Congress could hardly have contemplated. The majority's ruling that an age discrimination plaintiff in a multi-factor pension case must adduce sufficient evidence to show that the challenged disparity was "actually motivated" by age is at odds with the statute's simple "because of" language and more particularly with a legion of cases requiring only that age be "a factor" in order to be actionable. Perhaps the explanation is that the "actually motivated" standard, as applied to this unusual pension scheme, is a ticket good for this day and train only. That is, engrafting an actual motivation requirement onto the ADEA's simple causation standard is necessary in pension design cases because of the uncertainty that the disparate treatment is because of age and not because of other factors, such as years of service. But, do not be surprised if enterprising defense attorneys try to capitalize more generally on the majority's phrasing of the new test for discrimination in this uniquely narrow case. The result is that while the Court resolved one question about a peculiar type of pension plan design, it may have opened the door to other challenges and thus destabilized the law by tinkering with the definition of discrimination.
B. Employee Benefits.
The Court's decisions appeared to favor plan participants in two important cases, but actually left a victimized participant without a clear path to a monetary recovery in one case and all victims but the plaintiff without assurance of relief in the other case. Viewed through a wider lens, the Court's work in the benefits
---(2008)
The Court decided that a participant in a defined contribution pension plan may sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct impaired the value of plan assets in the participant's individual account.
James LaRue sued his former employer, DeWolff, Boberg & Associates and the retirement savings plan it administered. As permitted by the Plan, LaRue had directed DeWolff to make certain changes to the investments in his account in 2001 and 2002, but DeWolff failed to carry out his instructions. As a consequence, DeWolff's failure depleted LaRue's interest in the Plan by approximately $150,000. Disclaiming any request for damages, LaRue sought "make whole" and other equitable relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that LaRue was not permitted to seek damages under ERISA section 502(a)(3). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting LaRue's argument under 502(a)(3) that his request for "make whole" relief was equitable and holding further that LaRue could not rely on ERISA section 502(a)(2) because that provision protects the entire plan and not the rights of individual beneficiaries. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both the 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) issues.
The Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit on the ERISA 502(a)(2) issue. Justice Stevens' opinion of the Court begins with the premise that the defendants breached fiduciary obligations under section 409 of ERISA and that the breaches had an adverse impact on the value of plan assets in LaRue's account. The Court notes that the defendants' misconduct falls squarely within the statutory category relating to the proper management, administration and investment of plan assets. Justice Stevens then distinguishes the denial of relief under 502(a)(2) in Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) . In contrast to LaRue's request for relief from a shortfall in his account, Justice Stevens emphasizes that Russell had received all her plan benefits, but was seeking consequential damages for delay in processing her claim.
While Court in Russell (like the Fourth Circuit in this case) stressed that 502(a)(2) protects the financial integrity of the entire plan from fiduciary misconduct, Justice Stevens explains that it did so when defined benefit plans were the norm for pension plans and that threats to an individual's account were derivative of threats to the plan as a whole. Noting that landscape has changed and that defined contribution plans dominate the scene today, Justice Stevens points out that fiduciary mismanagement of a defined contribution plan can improperly reduce benefits without threatening the entire plan's solvency. The Court thus regards the "entire plan" references in its prior decisions as beside the point in cases involving defined contribution plans. Bolstering this point, the opinion also notes that the exemption in section 404(c) of fiduciaries from liability for losses caused by a participant's exercise of control of individual account assets would serve no real purpose if fiduciaries had no liability for losses in an individual account. Accordingly, the Court holds that although section 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment and concurring in Justice Stevens' conclusion that the Fourth Circuit's analysis was flawed. Because LaRue's right to direct investment of his contributions is based on the Plan, the Chief Justice says that his claim turns on the application of Plan terms and arguably lies exclusively under section 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits or enforce rights under the terms of his plan. If so, it is not clear whether LaRue's requests for relief under other subsections of section 502(a) are "appropriate" within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts notes that on remand there is nothing precluding the lower courts from considering what he regards as the significance of the prospect that LaRue may only have a claim under 502(a)(1)(B).
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment and agreeing that LaRue alleged a cognizable claim. But Justice Thomas criticizes the Court's reliance on trends in the pension markets and, claiming reliance on ERISA's text, harmonizes the Court's judgment with the Russell decision in a different way. Justice Thomas characterizes the question in this case as whether losses in LaRue's account are losses to the plan. He answers in the affirmative because the assets allocated to LaRue's account are plan assets. Because a defined contribution plan is, according to Justice Thomas, essentially the sum of its parts, losses to an individual account are necessarily losses to the entire plan. Accordingly, section 502(a)(2) permits LaRue to recover such losses on behalf of the plan. A footnote at the end of the opinion explains that "[o]f course, a participant suing to recover benefits on behalf of the plan is not entitled to monetary relief payable directly to him; rather, any recovery must be paid to the plan." 169 L. Ed. 2d at 858. 
The Court decided that a benefit plan administrator's dual role of determining eligibility for and funding benefits creates a conflict of interest; that a reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in determining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits; and that the significance of the factor will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") serves as the administrator and insurer of Sears, Roebuck & Company's long term disability plan,. MetLife is obliged by the plan to pay from its own funds valid claims for benefits. The plan in turn grants MetLife discretion to determine which claims are valid. Wanda Glenn, a Sears employee, was diagnosed with a severe form of cardiomyopathy whose symptoms include fatigue and shortness of breath. She applied for plan benefits in June of 2000, and MetLife found the claim valid for an initial 24 months of benefits, determining that she could not perform the material duties of her own job. MetLife also directed Glenn to a law firm that would assist her in applying for Social Security disability benefits which would partially offset MetLife's payments to her. In April of 2002 an administrative law judge granted her permanent disability benefits retroactive to April of 2000, concluding that her illness prevented her from performing any job (for which she was qualified) existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Glenn herself received none of the back benefits, as 75% went to MetLife and 25% went to the lawyers to whom MetLife had directed Glenn. MetLife then denied Glenn's claim for benefits beyond the 24 month initial period, determining that she was capable of performing full time sedentary work and thus had not shown that she was incapable of performing the material duties of any gainful occupation for which she was reasonably qualified.
Glenn sued MetLife, seeking judicial review of its benefit denial. The district court ruled in MetLife's favor, and on appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed the benefits denial under a deferential standard because of the discretion granted to MetLife under the plan, but it treated as a "relevant factor" the conflict of interest arising from MetLife's dual role as decider and payor of benefit claims. The Court of Appeals set aside MetLife's determination because of (a) the conflict of interest, (b) MetLife's failure to reconcile its conclusion that Glenn could work with the Social Security Administration's opposite conclusion; (c) MetLife's exclusive focus on one doctor's report suggesting that Glenn could work; (d) MetLife's failure to provide all treating physician reports to its own hired experts; and (e) MetLife's failure to take account of evidence that stress aggravated Glenn's condition. MetLife petitioned for certiorari, asking the Court to determine whether a plan administrator that evaluates and pays claims operates under a conflict of interest in making benefit determinations. The Solicitor General suggested that the Court also consider how such a conflict should be taken into account on judicial review of benefit determinations. The Court granted certiorari to consider both questions.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined in full by four other Justices, affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. The majority first recites four principles of judicial review set forth in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) : (1) a reviewing court should be guided by principles of trust law such that benefit determinations are fiduciary acts by plan administrators who owe a special duty of loyalty to plan beneficiaries; (2) trust law requires that judicial review shall be under a de novo standard unless the plan provides to the contrary; (3) where the plan does provide to the contrary by granting discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits, trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate; and (4) if the administrator or fiduciary with discretion operates under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of such discretion. Slip op., pp. 4-5. Justice Breyer characterizes this case as focusing on the fourth factor.
The Court first concludes that an administrator who both evaluates and pays claims creates the kind of conflict of interest referred to in Firestone's fourth principle. Recognizing that an employer who assumes these dual roles has a clear conflict, Justice Breyer says it is less clear where the plan administrator is a "professional insurance company" which has a greater incentive (because of the fees it charges in a competitive market) to provide accurate claims processing. Nonetheless, the majority finds that an ERISA conflict exists here partly because the employer is conflicted in choosing an insurance carrier based on fees and partly because ERISA imposes higher-than-marketplace standards on insurers. Justice Breyer also notes that a rule treating employers and insurers alike can still take account of their differences by diminishing the significance or severity of the conflict in individual cases.
In determining how the conflict should be taken into account on judicial review, the majority begins by saying that it "elucidates" what the Court set forth in Firestone's fourth principle -namely that the conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. Reaffirming that the standard of review is, under applicable trust principles, a deferential one, the majority declines to adopt a de novo standard in conflict cases. Nor does the majority believe it necessary for the courts to apply special burden of proof rules or other special evidentiary or procedural rules, for the complexities of benefit determinations are such that the Court cannot come up with a "one size fits all" procedural system likely to promote fair and accurate review. Instead, Justice Breyer says that "any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the degree of closeness necessary [sic] depending upon the tiebreaking factor's inherent or case-specific importance." Slip op., p. 10. The opinion cites as examples of how a conflict may prove more important: a history of biased claims administration, a failure to wall off benefits people from finance people, and a failure to impose systemic checks that penalize inaccurate determinations. Reciting with approval the Sixth Circuit's reliance on a combination of factors, the majority found nothing improper in the way that court weighed a number of serious concerns along with the conflict factor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision.
Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment and concurring in all but the portion of Justice Breyer's opinion as to how the conflict factor is to be weighed by the reviewing court. Expressing concern that the majority's approach will increase the level of scrutiny in every conflict case, the Chief Justice would consider the conflict only where there is evidence that the benefit denial was motivated or affected by the conflict. In this case the Chief Justice joins the judgment of affirmance because the lower court was justified in finding an abuse of discretion wholly apart from MetLife's conflict of interest.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kennedy agrees that MetLife had a conflict and that the Court's framework for considering the conflict is consistent with Firestone and is both important and correct. Because the Sixth Circuit made no effort to assess MetLife's attempts to safeguard against its conflict, the case should, in Justice Kennedy's opinion, be remanded to give MetLife a chance to defend its decision under the framework adopted by the majority.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion agreeing that MetLife had a conflict of interest, but expressing the view that it is still an open question about whether an employer would have such a conflict in similar circumstances. As to how a conflict should be regarded by a reviewing court, Justice Scalia opines that under the law of trusts, a fiduciary with a conflict does not abuse its discretion unless the conflict actually and improperly motivates the decision. Finding no evidence that MetLife acted dishonestly or with improper motive, or failed to use judgment or acted beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment, the dissenters would conclude that MetLife acted within the discretion entrusted to it, even where its decision about Glenn's ability to work is contrary to the Social Security determination. Accordingly, the dissenters would remand to the Sixth Circuit for a determination as to the reasonableness of the benefits denial without regard to the existence of a conflict of interest. The Court decided that the statutory grounds for vacating and modifying an arbitration award subject to the Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive.
C. Dispute Resolution
The Court's cultivation of arbitration as a final and binding means of resolving employment disputes reached nearly full flower in its two decisions this term. In each case the Court's regard for what Congress intended to accomplish in the Federal Arbitration Act emerged as a central element of its rationale. Regrettably, the deferential respect for the will of Congress on this one statute does not appear to restrain the Court's hubris in its general approach to Congressional regulation of the employment relationship. The practical "takeaway" from these two cases, nonetheless, is that the Court continues to favor arbitration as a means of resolving disputes, and there is little reason to believe that its favor will not continue to embrace employment disputes.
Hall
Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. leased a manufacturing site in Oregon to Mattel, Inc. The lease provided that the tenant would indemnify the landlord for any failure by Mattel or its predecessors to follow environmental laws. After tests of well water on the property disclosed pollutants from discharges by Mattel and its predecessors, Mattel stopped using the water, signed a consent order with the state for cleaning up the site and in 2001 gave Hall Street notice of intent to terminate the lease. Hall Street filed suit contesting Mattel's right to terminate and seeking indemnification from Mattel for the costs of cleaning up chemical residue on the site.
The district court ruled in a bench trial in favor of Mattel on the termination issue. After an unsuccessful try at mediating the indemnification claim, the parties proposed to submit that claim to arbitration. The district court approved the parties' arbitration agreement and entered an order providing that the Court "shall vacate" any award where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence or the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous. The arbitrator then ruled for Mattel, concluding that no indemnification was due for failure to comply with state water quality standards because they deal with human health as distinct from environmental contamination. Hall Street moved to vacate the award based on legal error. The district court agreed with Hall Street and remanded to the arbitrator for further consideration. On remand, the arbitrator, following the district court's view that the state act was an applicable environmental law, ruled in favor of Hall Street. Both parties sought modification of the award, and the district court, again applying the standard of review it had approved, corrected the arbitrator's calculation of interest and otherwise upheld the award. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Mattel contended that the court-approved provision for judicial review of an award for legal error was unenforceable. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Mattel and reversed and instructed the district court to consider the original award under the standard of review provided in the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 10, 11. The district court again vacated the original award on the ground that the arbitrator's implausible interpretation of the lease exceeded his powers under the parties' agreement. On a second appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court again reversed the district court, agreeing with Mattel that implausibility is not a statutory ground for vacating or correcting an award. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA's grounds for vacatur and modification are exclusive.
After oral argument, the Supreme Court entered an order on November 16, 2007 directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing issues involving the availability of judicial review outside what is authorized by the FAA.
The Court, following the supplemental briefing it ordered, ruled in a 6 to 3 decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment, holding that the FAA's grounds for prompt vacatur and modification of an arbitration award are exclusive and may not be modified by contract. Justice Souter's opinion for the Court first explains the FAA's judicial review provisions for streamlined treatment as an alternative to a separate contract action in state or federal court. As his opinion points out, the lower courts were split on the issue of whether the FAA's grounds for review are exclusive or are open to expansion by agreement.
The majority rejects Hall Street's argument that prior decisions of the Court implied, if not held, that arbitration awards are reviewable under the FAA for "manifest disregard of the law." Acknowledging that there is language in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) , that arguably supports such a standard, the Court points out that the language was not part of Wilko's holding and was ambiguous in any event. Likewise, the majority rejects Hall Street's argument that because Congress, in the FAA, favored private agreements to resolve disputes, the agreement crafted by the parties here ought to prevail. Justice Souter's opinion reasons that neither the text nor the history of the FAA supports Hall Street's position. (Justice Scalia declined to join the legislative history rationale or explanation.) Indeed, the majority points out that the FAA's categories in sections 10 and 11 emphasize something more than mistakes of law and that the language of section 9 carries "no hint of flexibility." The more sensible regard for the text of the FAA indicates, according to Justice Souter, that broader review would "bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process." 170 L. Ed. 2d at 265. Finally, the opinion notes that amici for Hall Street claimed that parties will flee from arbitration if expanded review is not available, while an amicus for Mattel foresaw such flight if such review were available. Justice Souter declined to get into that debate, concluding that whatever the consequences of the Court's holding, the FAA's text "gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds." Id. at 266.
Having dispatched of the question on which certiorari was granted, the majority stressed that it was not purporting to say that the FAA excludes more searching review of arbitral awards based on authority outside the FAA. The Court posited several avenues that Hall Street might yet travel in seeking to enforce the arbitrator's ultimate award in its favor. Noting that there is no reason for the Court now to treat the case as a purely common law case, there is still a question about whether the order approving the agreement for expanded review should be enforced as a measure of the district court's authority to manage its cases under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, however, declined to resolve that question now, remanding the case for further proceedings (after noting that issues of waiver and the relevance of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. 651, et seq. may yet be pressed by Hall Street.) Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented on the ground that the FAA favors, rather than precludes, the parties' private agreement for expanded judicial review of what the dissent characterized as the arbitrator's "glaring error of law." In the dissent's view, the literal text of the FAA not only does not foreclose negotiated judicial review provisions, but it also is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to effectuate the intent of the contracting parties. And, if the FAA issue were as close as the Court views it, Justice Stevens would apply a presumption in favor of the parties' freedom to resolve it. While the dissenters agree that the Ninth Circuit's judgment should be vacated and that there may be additional avenues for judicial review, they would direct the Ninth Circuit to affirm the judgment of the district court enforcing the arbitration award.
Justice Breyer dissented in a separate opinion, expressing the view that the FAA does not preclude enforcement of an agreement giving the court power to set aside an arbitration award embodying an arbitrator's mistake about the law. (Indeed, the entire Court agrees to that proposition.) Justice Breyer, however, would not remand the case for further decisionmaking. Instead, he would simply instruct the Ninth Circuit to affirm the district court's judgment enforcing the arbitral award. The Labor Commissioner's hearing officer determined that Ferrer had stated a claim within the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction, but denied Ferrer's motion to stay the arbitration for lack of authority to grant such relief. Ferrer then filed suit in Los Angeles County seeking a declaratory judgment that the controversy was not subject to arbitration. Preston moved to compel arbitration. The Superior Court denied Preston's motion and enjoined him from proceeding before the arbitrator until the Labor Commissioner determined she has no jurisdiction. On Preston's appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the TAA vests exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in the Labor Commissioner. The court found the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) , inapposite because it involved state courts and not state administrative agencies. The California Supreme Court denied Preston's petition for review. The Supreme Court of the United States then granted Preston's petition for certiorari to determine whether the FAA overrides a state law vesting initial adjudicatory authority in a state administrative agency.
The Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, reversed the judgment of the California Court of Appeal in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg. As the Court points out, the underlying dispute between the parties is simple: Was Preston acting as a talent agent, as Ferrer claims (in which case the contract violates the TAA and is unenforceable) or was he acting as a personal manager (in which case the contract does not violate the TAA and is enforceable)? The controversy before the Supreme Court is whether the "talent agent v. personal manager" issue should be determined by an arbitrator or by the Labor Commissioner. Ferrer insisted that the Labor Commissioner had exclusive original jurisdiction of that controversy, while Preston urged that the TAA defense had to do with the legality of the contract and had to be determined in arbitration. The Court decided in favor of arbitration of the legality of the parties' contract.
Several organizations whose members do business with the State of California sued the California Department of Health Services and several state officials to enjoin enforcement of AB 1889. Two labor organizations intervened to defend the statute's validity. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the business organizations, holding that the NLRA preempts the contested statute because provisions of the state law regulate employer speech about union organizing. The Ninth Circuit, after affirming twice, granted rehearing en banc and reversed the district court's judgment, concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude states from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court, in a 7 to 2 decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit in an opinion by Justice Stevens. The Court noted that although the NLRA contains no express preemption provision, prior Court decisions have recognized two types of preemption necessary to implement federal labor policy: (a) "Garmon preemption" forbidding states to regulate activity that is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA and (b) "Machinists preemption" forbidding any regulation of conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated because it is left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces. In this case the Court held that the two contested portions of the California stattue are unenforceable by virtue of Machinists preemption because they "regulate within a zone protected and reserved for market freedom." After reviewing the NLRA's history, the majority concludes that Congress has made a policy judgment that free debate about unionization is a central element of national labor policy and that the express protection of "uninhibited, robust and wideopen debate in labor disputes" forcefully buttresses the Machinists preemption analysis in this case. The majority then opines that California's policy judgment that partisan employer speech interferes with an employee's choice about union representation is just what Congress renounced in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA. Accordingly, the Court holds that "[t]o the extent sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further the express goal of AB 1889, the provisions are unequivocally pre-empted." Slip op., p. 8.
Justtice Stevens' opinion finds none of the three reason advanced for avoiding Machinists preemption persuasive. First, the fact that the statute restricts only an employer's use of state funds, instead of its receipt of state funds, is inconsequential. Because the use restriction is not accompanied by a safe harbor for employers as to whether an employer has complied and because of significant risk of litigation costs and mistaken liability, California's reliance on a use restriction impermissibly burdens free debate (and that is so regardless of the fact that these restrictions are less onerous than federal restrictions that have been upheld under the First Amendment.) Second, the majority recognizes that the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") has regulated election eve speech, but that does not mean that free speech falls outside the zone of activities that Congress intended to be regulated by market forces. Distinguishing the "special setting" of imminent elections, the Court declares that Congress has denied the Board the authority to regulate the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by the California statutes. Third, the Court is not persuaded that a few isolated federal restrictions on the use of federal funds to assist, promote or deter union organizing are intended to alter the broader contours of federal labor policy. Recognizing that it would be a closer question if there were a federal statute applying analogous restrictions to all federal grants or expenditures, the majority regards the few cited federal laws as not indicative of an invitation to the states to override the national labor policy of free debate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion expressing the view that the California policy expressed in AB 1889 does not constitute regulation that the NLRA preempts. According to Justice Breyer, the operative provisions of the California law neither compels nor prohibits labor-related acitivity; it just says "do not do so on our dime." California's refusal to pay for speech does not impermissibly discourage speech, as the employer can spend its own money instead of the public's money.
Moreover, states generally retain the power to decide whether and how to spend or not spend public funds. Because the purpose of the state law here is to maintain a position of neutrality on contested labor matters and despite the targeted nature of a restriction applicable only to labor relations, the dissent does not find that California is "regulating" anything that Congress said is not regulable.
The dissenters agree that if state compliance provisions unreasonably discouraged expenditure of the employer's own funds, the NLRA might well preempt such provisions. But, the dissenters say that they cannot on this record reach such a conclusion because the lower courts did not address the portion of the business organizations' motion for summary judgment dealing with the compliance provisions. Pointing out that California had submitted expert evidence showing that the accounting and recordkeeping requirements of the statute are flexible and less onerous than those for federal grant recipients, the dissenters would vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings on the compliance-related questions. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. ---(2007) , coverage requirements, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. 549 U.S. ---(2007), and governmental immunity, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
